Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
USI Publications

Urban Studies Institute

2016

Foreclosures and Neighborhoods: The Shape and Impacts of the
U.S. Mortgage Crisis
Daniel Immergluck
Georgia State University, dimmergluck@gsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/urban_studies_institute
Part of the Urban Studies and Planning Commons

Recommended Citation
Immergluck, D. (2015). Foreclosures and neighborhoods: The shape and impacts of the U.S. mortgage
crisis. In McCarthy, G. and Moody, S., Land and the city. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Urban Studies Institute at ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in USI Publications by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.

Land and the City
Edited by

George W. McCarthy, Gregory K. Ingram,
and Samuel A. Moody

© 2016 by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy
All rights reserved.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Land and the city /
edited by George W. McCarthy, Gregory K. Ingram,
and Samuel A. Moody.
1 online resource.
Conference proceedings.
Includes index.
Description based on data provided by publisher; resource not viewed.
ISBN 978-1-55844-317-4 (prc)—ISBN 978-1-55844-318-1 (epub)—
ISBN 978-1-55844-319-8 (ibook)—ISBN 978-1-55844-320-4 (pdf)
1. City planning—United States—Congresses. 2. City planning—China—
Congresses. 3. Cities and towns—United States—Social conditions—
21st century—Congresses. 4. Cities and towns—China—Social
conditions—21st century—Congresses. 5. Housing policy—
United States—Congresses. 6. Housing policy—China—
Congresses. I. McCarthy, George W. (George William),
1956-editor. II. Ingram, Gregory K., editor.
III. Moody, Samuel A., editor.
HT167.2
307.1'2160973—dc23
2015030599
Designed by Vern Associates
Composed in Sabon by Achorn International in Bolton, Massachusetts.
manufactured in the united states of america

7
Foreclosures and Neighborhoods:
The Shape and Impacts of the
U.S. Mor tgage Crisis
Dan Immergluck

T

   he U.S. mortgage crisis beginning in 2007 resulted in very high levels of
foreclosures in many neighborhoods around the country. In addition to
harming individual households, foreclosures had negative spillover effects on nearby properties and households, including lower property values and
higher crime rates. To understand the effects of foreclosures on households and
neighborhoods, it is important first to understand the demographic and geographic distributions of foreclosures and how they may have changed during the
foreclosure crisis, which persisted for more than five years, from 2007 to beyond
2012. Spurred in part by the crisis, dozens of studies have been published on the
effects of foreclosures on neighborhoods; somewhat fewer studies have systematically examined the intrametropolitan morphology of the crisis, including how this
morphology varied across metropolitan areas and over time. This chapter first
reviews the geographic incidence and concentrations of foreclosures, and then reviews evidence of the impacts of foreclosures on households and neighborhoods.

The Racial and Spatial Dynamics of Subprime Lending
and Foreclosures  
Lending Patterns by Race and Space

With the rise of the subprime mortgages in the 1990s, the problems of discrimination and redlining in mortgage markets evolved into a new shape and scale.
While basic access to institutional mortgage credit remained an issue, the rise of
high-risk subprime lenders created wider problems in the pricing and terms of
203
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mortgages. Some of the earliest work documenting the segmentation of the mortgage market across race and space came from Chicago, the birthplace of Com
munity Reinvestment Act activism. This research showed that the number of
refinance loans made in predominantly black neighborhoods grew almost thirtyfold from 1993 to 1998, while subprime refinance loans in predominantly white
neighborhoods grew by about twofold (Immergluck and Wiles 1999). By 1998,
the largest lenders in predominantly black neighborhoods were specialized subprime firms, while the top originators in predominantly white neighborhoods
were prime lenders. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) analyzed lending patterns in the United States, paying
special attention to five large cities, and found that subprime lenders dominated
black neighborhoods (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
2000). Later analyses continued to document segmented home loan markets in
cities throughout the country, finding that subprime lending was disproportionately concentrated in minority neighborhoods (Bradford 2002; Scheessele 2002).
Scheessele (2002) and Immergluck (2004) both found that the racial composition
of a neighborhood was strongly associated with the concentration of subprime
lending, even after they accounted for other neighborhood housing and economic
characteristics.
In the aftermath of the 1990s subprime boom, researchers also found that
the race of the borrower had a significant effect on the likelihood of him or her
receiving a subprime versus a prime loan, even after they controlled for credit
history and other variables. For example, a study of home loans conducted by
an affiliate of the Mortgage Bankers Association found that the probability of a
borrower receiving a subprime loan increased by approximately one-third when
the borrower was black, even when controlling for credit history, location, and
other variables (Pennington-Cross, Yezer, and Nichols 2000).
Additional research has documented the relationship between race and subprime lending during the 2000s. Based on calculations of researchers at the Federal Reserve Board, figure 7.1 shows the differences among whites, Hispanics,
and blacks in their likelihood of receiving subprime loans in 2006, at the height
of the subprime boom (Avery, Brevoort, and Canner 2007). For the United States
as a whole, more than 53 percent of black home buyers and more than 52 percent of blacks refinancing their homes received subprime loans. Moreover, black
home buyers were three times more likely to receive a subprime loan than white
home buyers. Even when researchers adjusted for variations in subprime incidence due to differences in income, loan size, metropolitan statistical area, gender, and the presence of a co-applicant, they found that most of this differential
persisted, with the adjusted rate for blacks still being about 2.7 times the rate
for whites. Almost half of Hispanic home buyers in 2006 also received subprime
loans. While the difference between Hispanics and whites declined somewhat
after researchers controlled for these factors, the adjusted differential remained
sizable, at approximately 2 to 1.
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Figure 7.1
High-Cost (Subprime) Lending Incidence by Race of Borrower, 2006 (%)
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Note: Adjusted for income, loan size, presence of co-applicant, metropolitan statistical area, and gender.
Source: Data from Avery, Brevoort, and Canner (2007).

Similarly, Wyly and Ponder (2011) reported large disparities in the likelihood
of different racial and ethnic groups receiving subprime loans. For example, they
found that in 2006, single black women were Figure
more 7.1
than four times as likely to
receive subprime loans as white couples and more than three times as likely to
Lincoln_McCarthy_Land
and the City
receive subprime loans as single white
women.
Faber (2013) examined home purchase loans that originated nationally in
2006, controlling for borrower income, neighborhood racial and income composition, regional and metropolitan location, and the presence of a co-applicant. He
found that blacks and Hispanics were 2.4 times more likely to receive subprime
loans than whites. Moreover, Faber determined that higher-income blacks and
Hispanics were more likely to receive subprime loans than lower-income minorities, while higher-income whites were less likely to receive subprime loans than
lower-income whites. Some of this difference may have been due to higher property
values associated with higher-income versus lower-income minority homeowners.
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Moreover, higher-income whites may have been better served by prime financial
institutions than higher-income minorities, leaving them less vulnerable to aggres
sive subprime lenders.
The racial patterns of subprime lending were also present at a spatial level, as
predominantly minority neighborhoods were much more likely to see high levels
of subprime loans than other neighborhoods. Kingsley and Pettit (2009) found
that the density of subprime loans at a neighborhood level was highest in black
and Hispanic neighborhoods during the subprime boom period, from 2004 to
2006. They also found that the highest subprime densities were in relatively lowpoverty, high-minority neighborhoods. This finding might be related to the relatively higher-value housing stock in lower-poverty census tracts.
Mayer and Pence (2008) focused on the spatial distribution of subprime
lending in 2005. Using loan data from Loan Performance (now known as CoreLogic), they found that subprime lending in predominantly black and Hispanic
zip codes was much higher than in other areas, even after controlling for credit
scores and other economic characteristics of the zip codes. Similarly, Calem, Hershaff, and Wachter (2010), analyzing home loans in seven major cities in 1997
and 2002, found that blacks were more likely than whites to receive subprime
loans, even after controlling for borrower income and a variety of neighborhood
characteristics, including educational level and average credit score.
Gruenstein-Bocian, Ernst, and Li (2008) were among the first to combine
publicly available Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data (including data
on borrowers’ race and income) with private data from a major loan data vendor (including information on loan terms and credit quality). They found that
African American home buyers were 31 percent more likely to receive a high-rate
fixed-rate mortgage with a prepayment penalty than white borrowers with similar loan and personal characteristics, including similar credit scores.
Gruenstein-Bocian et al. (2011) found that racial disparities in receiving subprime loans during the peak of the subprime boom were actually greater among
borrowers with higher credit scores. This was consistent with an earlier, wellpublicized analysis by the Wall Street Journal suggesting that many subprime
borrowers could have qualified for prime loans based on their credit scores
(Brooks and Simon 2007). These studies added to concerns that there had been
systematic—and perhaps intentional—steering of minorities toward higher-cost
and riskier subprime loans. In particular, Apgar, Bendimerad, and Essene (2007)
found that the probability of receiving a subprime loan was heavily dependent
on the particular lending channel through which the borrower received the loan.

. Consumer advocates argued that yield-spread premiums, in particular, encouraged mortgage brokers to steer borrowers toward high-cost loans. A disproportionate level of mortgage
broker activity in minority communities and/or a higher vulnerability to such steering among
minority borrowers could have contributed to the prevalence of minorities who had good
credit receiving subprime loans.
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For example, in comparing the customers of a traditional prime lending unit and
a specialized subprime lending unit owned by the same financial firm, they found
that a borrower receiving a loan through the subprime channel was much more
likely to receive a subprime loan (even if he or she could qualify for a prime
loan—a loan that the lender could make or could help the borrower obtain) than
a similar borrower obtaining a loan via the prime lending channel. The channel
that the borrower happens to enter the parent firm through (often due to marketing from one unit or the other) determines the pricing and terms of credit, rather
than the qualifications of the borrower.
Researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia combined HMDA
data with information from a national proprietary data set on loan and borrower
characteristics for three states (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware) from
1999 to 2007 (Smith and Hevener 2014). As in the work of Gruenstein-Bocian
and associates (Gruenstein-Bocian, Ernst, and Li 2008; Gruenstein-Bocian et al.
2011), combining HMDA data with loan-level data on borrower credit scores
and loan terms provided a rich, multivariate, loan-level analysis. Smith and Heve
ner (2014) found that blacks had a high probability of receiving subprime versus
prime loans during all years studied. They also estimated the difference in the
likelihood of whites and blacks receiving subprime loans due to factors other
than race, including income, credit score, neighborhood characteristics, and loan
characteristics, among others. At most, these factors explained only two-thirds
of the higher likelihood of blacks receiving subprime loans in 2005. This left onethird of the difference due solely to race, suggesting the likelihood of discriminatory forces in determining who received subprime loans. Researchers in other
locations using data sets containing information on loan terms and credit scores
found similar results (Courchane 2007; Reid and Laderman 2009).
Foreclosure Patterns by Race and Space

Minority homeowners were disproportionately impacted by foreclosures, especially in the earlier years of the crisis, when subprime loans accounted for the
bulk of the problem. Gruenstein-Bocian, Li, and Ernst (2010) analyzed foreclo
sures between 2007 and 2009, at the height of the initial, subprime phase of the
foreclosure crisis. They estimated that owner-occupied homes accounted for approximately 80 percent of all foreclosures and that black and Hispanic homeowners were disproportionately impacted. Figure 7.2 presents some of the findings
from their study. Almost 8 percent of first mortgages to black homeowners that
originated between 2005 and 2008—the height of the subprime lending boom—
went into foreclosure between 2007 and 2009, compared with only 4.5 percent
for whites. That means the black foreclosure rate was 76 percent greater than
the white rate. Similarly, the foreclosure rate for Hispanic homeowners was
7.7 percent, or 71 percent greater than the white rate. Even so, because whites
accounted for a majority of borrowers during that time, they also accounted for
more than half of all foreclosures. Blacks and Hispanics together accounted for
about 28 percent of foreclosures, with Asians and other ethnicities accounting
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Percentage of first-lien owner-occupied mortgages originated
2005–2008 and entering foreclosure 2007–2009

Figure 7.2
Foreclosure Rates for Owner-Occupied Homes by Race and Ethnicity, 2007–2009
12

Distribution of first-lien
foreclosures, 2007–2009 (%)

10
7.9

8

7.7

Asian
3.3
6.0

6
4.6

4.5

Other
12.8

White
56.1

Hispanic
16.2

4
Black
11.6

2
0

White

Black

Hispanic

Asian

Other

Note: Data are for first-lien owner-occupied mortgages originated in 2005–2008 and entering foreclosure in 2007–2009.
Source: Gruenstein-Bocian, Li, and Ernst (2010).

for the remaining portion. Yet while the subprime crisis disproportionately affected black and Hispanic homeowners, it was not confined to people of color,
even in the early stages. Later, as foreclosures spread to the prime market and
consequently to a broader set of middle-income and majority-white communiFigure
ties, whites accounted for an
even7.2
larger portion of foreclosures in most regions.
During the Lincoln_McCarthy_Land
foreclosure crisis, media
reports
and the
City fluctuated between describing
foreclosures as primarily affecting central city neighborhoods (Whitehouse 2007)
and describing them as being concentrated in newer suburban or exurban areas
(Farrell 2008). The evidence on the intrametropolitan distribution of the crisis is
somewhat more complicated than either of these simplistic narratives would suggest, with many inner-city neighborhoods and many newly developed suburban
areas both being hit hard. This dichotomy was driven in large part by the op
portunistic nature of the subprime mortgage boom. High-risk credit flowed disproportionately both into vulnerable inner-city neighborhoods, where mortgage
brokers aggressively marketed home loans, especially refinance loans, and into
newly developing suburban and exurban communities, where home ownership
was attainable but perhaps not always sustainable, especially in the event of economic hardships.
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Due to differences in the geography of housing, income, and race among
metropolitan areas, as well as to differences in the penetration of the subprime
lending industry from city to city, the neighborhood distribution of foreclosures
varied a good deal across metropolitan areas. Which neighborhoods were hit
hardest by the crisis depended on the particular economic and housing geography
of the metropolitan area. More specifically, the incidence and concentration of
foreclosures depended not only on the spatial determinants of default and foreclosure but also on the geographic distribution of subprime and high-risk loans.
Immergluck (2010a) showed that in many older industrial metropolitan areas
with traditionally weaker economies and housing markets, such as Detroit and
Cleveland (but also some cities with stronger regional economies, including Atlanta and Chicago), subprime delinquencies and foreclosures had been increasing
well before 2007. By the first quarter of 2006, subprime delinquency rates had
already exceeded 12 percent not only in states with more troubled economies,
such as Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana, but also in states such as
Georgia and Tennessee. Until late 2006, regions with very hot housing markets
experienced low delinquency rates, with California, Arizona, and Nevada having subprime delinquency below 6 percent. This was partly due to the fact that
borrowers struggling with their mortgages in hot markets could avoid default or
foreclosure by quickly refinancing or selling their homes. By the summer of 2007,
however, after appreciation had stalled in most places, delinquency and foreclo
sure rates were accelerating in most large metropolitan areas, with the steepest
increases in markets where housing values were also rapidly declining.
As discussed earlier, subprime lending was disproportionately concentrated
among minority homeowners, so higher levels of subprime foreclosures could be
expected to occur in predominantly minority neighborhoods, which comprise
many inner-city communities. At the same time, subprime and high-risk lending also helped fuel rapid growth in newer suburban and exurban communities,
especially in parts of the Southwest, California, and Florida (Ong and Pfeiffer
2008; Schafran and Wegman 2012; Schildt et al. 2013). Some media reports and
commentary, however, portrayed the crisis as one exclusively centered in a new
“slumburb” and ignored the fact that it was also heavily concentrated in many
older urban neighborhoods (Leinberger 2008).
One of the few studies of neighborhood-level foreclosure patterns across a
wide variety of metropolitan areas examined changes in the prevalence of foreclosed properties at the zip code level in 75 large metropolitan areas (Immergluck
2010b). This study analyzed the share of single-family properties (including town
homes and condominiums) that had been foreclosed on and repossessed by lending institutions, instead of measuring foreclosures by comparing foreclosures with
housing units. Many other estimates of foreclosure prevalence have effectively
assumed that each housing unit equates to a “mortgageable” property, a grossly
inaccurate assumption in neighborhoods with many multifamily rental units.
Based on an earlier study (Immergluck 2010a), U.S. metropolitan statistical
areas (MSAs) were classified into three categories of foreclosure activity. Type 1
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metros were those in which housing prices had remained relatively stable and
foreclosure levels had not been large prior to the advent of the crisis in 2007.
Type 2 metros were mostly older metropolitan areas where foreclosures had already reached relatively high levels before the crisis. Type 3 metros were the
“boom-bust” areas that had very low foreclosure rates before 2007 but began
experiencing sharp declines in housing prices after 2006. Figure 7.3 shows the
locations of the three types of metros. Type 1 metros were scattered across the
country and included most smaller metropolitan areas and many areas in the Great
Plains and Rocky Mountain regions, where the crisis tended to be less severe.
Type 2 metros included most larger metropolitan areas in the upper Midwest, as
well as some (mostly larger) metros in Colorado and the Southeast. Type 3 metros were clustered in California, Florida, and Nevada (including Las Vegas) and
Arizona (including Phoenix), as well as along the East Coast.
Regression results showed that from 2006 to 2008, zip codes in MSAs with
falling median home values experienced substantial increases in foreclosed properties, even after controlling for a wide variety of other differences in housing
market conditions and local foreclosure processes. Greater increases in unemployment also resulted in greater increases in foreclosures.
The prevalence of outstanding subprime mortgages in 2006 was a strong
predictor of increases in foreclosure rates. For every 1 percent increase in the
share of subprime mortgages, the number of foreclosed properties increased by
4 percent on average over the following two years. The number of junior—or
subordinate—mortgages outstanding at the end of 2006 was also positively associated with the growth in the number of foreclosures from 2006 to 2008. Another
key finding was that, other things being equal, zip codes with large numbers of
recently constructed homes experienced greater increases in foreclosures. This
may be due to the fact that large shares of homes in such areas were financed
during the peak of the subprime boom. At the same time, zip codes with higher
poverty rates experienced more foreclosures. In sum, the findings confirmed that
the subprime foreclosure crisis was concentrated both in higher-poverty (often
inner-city) neighborhoods and in many newer, sprawling communities.
Further analysis showed that neighborhood-level foreclosure patterns varied
across the two types of metropolitan areas that experienced the brunt of the
crisis—Type 2 and Type 3 metros. In general, Type 3 metros tended to see more
suburbanized foreclosure patterns, especially when central city neighborhoods
were relatively affluent, such as in San Diego and San Francisco. In addition, unemployment was a bigger driver of increased foreclosures in Type 2 versus Type
3 cities, which is consistent with the notion that foreclosures in many Type 2
communities may have been driven more by weaknesses in the broader economy
than was the case in Type 3 areas, where overheated housing markets fueled by
subprime credit were rapidly deflating. Finally, and important, the results showed
that neighborhoods with newer housing in Type 3 metros were particularly vulnerable to increased foreclosures, which is consistent with the idea that areas
that experienced high levels of subprime lending near the peak of the boom also
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Source: Immergluck (2010a).
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Figure 7.3
Lincoln_McCarthy_Land and the City

Figure 7.3
U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas by Foreclosure Market Type
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experienced particularly high levels of foreclosures. This occurred in Type 2 metros as well, but not to the same degree.
Schildt et al. (2013) examined the extent of the foreclosure crisis in suburban
areas of the 100 largest U.S. metros. Their findings were generally consistent with
those of Immergluck (2010b): suburban mortgage distress was highest in boombust metros, especially in inland California and Florida, while suburban areas in
older industrial cities were not hit as hard. This reflects the distribution of subprime lending in 2004–2008, as these loans were also likely to be more available
in suburban and exurban areas of boom-bust metros.
The Suburbanization of the Foreclosure Crisis Over Time

As the subprime foreclosure crisis triggered the Great Recession, and as the mortgage and housing markets became weaker, many homeowners with well-priced,
well-structured prime home loans began to find themselves in mortgage distress.
Many lost their jobs due to the recession, especially those working in industries
and regions that were vulnerable to the crash of the real estate market and, later,
the broader economy. By 2010, with housing prices having declined significantly
in most major metropolitan areas and many homeowners’ equity having been
eroded by mounting declines in home values, millions of prime borrowers found

Figure 7.4
The Suburban Share of Foreclosure Filings for Three Major Metropolitan Counties, 2007 and 2010
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themselves underwater on their mortgages (that is, their homes were worth less
than they owed on their mortgages). As a result, any substantial economic shock,
such as a job loss or health issue, could lead to foreclosure. In the meantime, an increasing share of subprime borrowers had already lost their homes, so that the share
of foreclosures associated with subprime loans began to decrease over time.
Figure 7.4 demonstrates that in three major urban counties—Fulton (Atlanta), Cuyahoga (Cleveland), and Cook (Chicago)—the number of foreclosure
filings (or notices) that occurred in the suburban parts of the counties grew significantly over a relatively short period of time, from 2007 to 2010. The suburban share grew the most, from 39 percent to just over 56 percent, in Fulton
County, where there are many working-class suburbs to the south of Atlanta.
Over the same period, the suburban share grew from 47 percent to 60 percent in
Cuyahoga County and from 46 percent to 53 percent in Cook County.

The Impacts and Costs of Foreclosure and the
Foreclosure Crisis  
The mortgage crisis brought financial pain to millions of American households.
It uprooted families from neighborhoods and social networks, forced kids to
change schools in the middle of the year, and created strains on mental and physical health, which in some cases triggered additional financial hardships. The costs
of the crisis went well beyond impacts on borrowers, significantly affecting local
property values and causing vacancy and blight, as well as the crime that often
follows. As property values deteriorated, neighbors saw the equity in their homes
decline, which made them more susceptible to foreclosure, as homes became
harder to sell or refinance. This section describes the literature on the harms that
arose due to mortgage distress and foreclosure. Not addressed are the wider macroeconomic effects of the foreclosure crisis, which catalyzed the Great Recession
and the global financial crisis.
Direct Harms to Foreclosed Households

Foreclosure has direct effects on households and individuals. Perhaps most obvious is the loss of the home itself and the need to relocate, often quickly and
under far-from-optimal conditions. Of course, beyond this is the potential loss of
wealth if the family had built up significant equity in the home. As suggested earlier in this chapter, the foreclosure crisis especially spurred losses in home equity
and decreased home ownership rates among people and communities of color.
Figure 7.5 shows that the net worth of households declined substantially from
2007 to 2011 and that the loss of wealth varied significantly across demographic
groups. This was due to variations in decreases in home values and to the fact
that the stock market, which generally constitutes a larger share of the household
wealth of higher-income, older, and nonminority households, recovered significantly from 2008 to 2011, while home values in many places did not.
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Figure 7.5
Changes in Real Net Worth by Demographic Group, 2007–2011 (%)
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As figure 7.5 indicates, whereas white and Asian households lost 38 percent
of their net worth from 2007 to 2011, households that were not white or Asian
lost 71 percent of their net worth. This difference reflects the disproportionate concentration of subprime loans among black and Hispanic homeowners.
Figure 7.5
Households in the 35- to 54-year-old range also lost far greater shares of their
and theofCity
wealth than olderLincoln_McCarthy_Land
households—61 percent
their net worth compared with
25 percent for those age 65 or older. Some of this difference is likely due to the
geography and timing of home buying among the younger age group, especially
those purchasing homes in boom-bust areas, where values were temporarily
boosted by the surge in subprime and high-risk lending.
The foreclosure crisis forced many families out of home ownership and into
the rental market. Certainly, home ownership is not the best form of tenure for all
families at all times. However, in many places in the United States and especially
for families with children, home ownership—if responsibly financed—can bring
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significant benefits compared with renting. It can provide a sense of stability and
control, allowing for predictable and relatively fixed housing costs (especially assuming access to a long-term, fixed-rate mortgage), and it can give families more
neighborhood options, including those with strong schools. Moreover, rapid declines in home ownership rates could have negative impacts on neighborhoods
in which it may have helped provide more stability to the area.
While home ownership rates overall declined somewhat moderately from its
peak in late 2004 and early 2005, the decline among certain demographic groups
was significantly greater. From 2005 to 2012, the home ownership rate for blacks
declined more than 5.5 percentage points, whereas it dropped only 2.5 percentage points for whites (Joint Center for Housing Studies 2013). Consistent with
the loss-of-wealth figures cited earlier, the home ownership rate of households
ages 25–44 fell almost 8.5 percentage points, while it stayed essentially flat for
those age 65 and older. Finally, as with the wealth figures, families with children
were hit particularly hard: married couples with children saw home ownership
decline 7 percentage points, compared with married couples without children,
who saw a decline of less than 2 percentage points.
Foreclosure has a direct impact on creditworthiness. Brevoort and Cooper
(2010) found that the credit scores of prime and near-prime borrowers who had
gone through foreclosure during the early years of the crisis dropped by 170–200
points compared with their predelinquency scores. They moved rapidly into becoming subprime borrowers. Moreover, it generally takes many years for credit
scores to rebound. Even seven years after a foreclosure, scores tend to remain
50–75 points below where they were before foreclosure, despite the fact that the
foreclosure can no longer be considered in calculating scores.
Lower credit scores have critical implications in an age when they are used
by employers in evaluating job applicants, landlords in assessing potential tenants, and insurance companies in underwriting and pricing automobile insurance. According to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), any firm that delivers
a good or service prior to receiving payment is effectively acting as a creditor
and is allowed access to credit reports and scores. Utilities providing electricity,
water, gas, phone, or cable TV often use credit bureau data. As early as 2002,
TransUnion, one of the three large credit bureaus, reported that banks and credit
unions had been overtaken as the largest users of credit data in the Philadelphia
region by nonbank entities such as hospitals, telecommunication firms, and utilities (Furletti 2002).
A substantial drop in credit scores, such as that caused by a foreclosure, has
the potential to create a web of barriers to employment, quality housing, and
basic goods and services. For example, the bulk of auto insurers use credit scores
in underwriting and pricing new policies, although some states prohibit this practice (Hartwig and Wilkinson 2003). In many lower-income neighborhoods, auto
insurance rates are already high, so a lower credit score may make use of an automobile prohibitively expensive, which in turn could limit employment opportunities. As landlords have increasingly relied on credit scores, postforeclosure
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households needing rental housing may have been excluded from the full array
of housing choices. Given the scarcity of affordable, decent rental housing in
many metropolitan areas, this could make quality housing even more difficult to
obtain. Compounding the damage of a lower credit score is the fact that employers have increasingly turned to credit data in screening job applicants. In a survey
of more than 500 human resource managers, the Society for Human Resource
Management (2012) found that 47 percent of employers used credit background
checks in making hiring decisions.
Beyond direct financial and economic harm, the foreclosure crisis forced some
children to change schools. Especially when this happens in the middle of the
school year, it can stunt academic achievement, an effect that can last for years.
In a study of Minneapolis during 2006–2007, Allen (2013) found that more than
90 percent of households moved after a foreclosure, with most changing neighborhoods and almost a third leaving the Minneapolis Public Schools district entirely. In a similar study of students in New York City, Been et al. (2011) found
that students living in properties that went through a foreclosure were likely to
move to a different, lower-performing school. And in a study of the San Diego
school system during 2001–2010, Dastrup and Betts (2012) found that the math
test scores and attendance rates of children in owner-occupied homes declined in
the year following a mortgage default and that these effects persisted after they
controlled for a wide variety of student and school characteristics.
While direct evidence on the effects of foreclosure on children continues
to emerge, there is already a large body of literature on the effects of residential instability that can help us understand the costs that foreclosure imposes
on families. Sandstrum and Huerta (2013) reviewed much of the literature and
found that “the experience of abrupt or frequent residential moves is stressful for
children since it requires them to detach themselves from what they know and
adapt to new surroundings” (29). They documented the considerable evidence
that chaotic environments can have negative effects on children, including their
scholastic outcomes. One longitudinal study of children from birth through age
nine, which controlled for a large number of demographic characteristics, found
that moving two or more times during the first two years of life increased the
incidence of problems such as anxiety, sadness, and withdrawal at age nine (Rum
bold et al. 2012). Another study found that moving before age four led to increased problem behaviors at that age, even after controlling for child and family
characteristics (Taylor and Edwards 2012).
In a longitudinal study of almost 5,000 children born in 20 large cities between 1998 and 2000, Ziol-Guest and McKenna (2013) found that children who
moved three or more times in the first five years of life had greater attention
problems than those who did not move; this difference remained significant after
they controlled for a large number of demographic and household characteristics. High levels of mobility also resulted in negative behavioral problems, and the
magnitude of the effect was larger than that for any other independent variable,
including race, ethnicity, parental education, and family structure, among others.
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In particular, residential instability has been shown to affect school perfor
mance adversely. Taylor and Edwards (2012) found that five-year-olds who had
moved five or more times since birth had vocabulary scores 41 percent of a stan
dard deviation below average. Other studies have demonstrated that residential
instability tends to result in lower grades, lower high school graduation rates, and
lower adult educational attainment (Adams and Chase-Lansdale 2002; Coulton,
Theodos, and Turner 2009; Sell et al. 2010; Ziol-Guest and Kalil 2013).
Studies in two different cities (Chicago and Baltimore) found similar effects
of school transfers on academic achievement (Alexander, Entwisle, and Dauber
1996; Temple and Reynolds 1999). For each school transfer, achievement scores
declined by approximately one month of school, even after the researchers controlled for other factors. In a meta-analysis of the literature, Reynolds, Chen, and
Herbers (2009), controlling for demographic and family characteristics, found
that school mobility reduced reading and math achievement, as well as high school
dropout rates. They also found that the negative effects of mobility increased with
each additional move, with effects during the early elementary and high school
years having the largest negative impacts on learning outcomes.
In some of the earliest research on the relationship between foreclosure and
health, Fields et al. (2007) studied 88 families going through foreclosure in five
cities around the country. They found that those families incurred a wide range
of attendant hardships and emotional difficulties, including harm to children’s
physical and mental health and trouble with their finances and credit histories.
Many respondents felt shame, which sometimes discouraged them from seeking
support services or even assistance from friends and family. According to Fields
et al. (2007), foreclosure harmed family stability and made it difficult for families
to make long-term plans. In some cases, foreclosure represented a “cascading
series of economic and emotional losses that interfere with people’s day-to-day
lives.” Many respondents took on additional employment to try to resolve delinquencies. More broadly, foreclosure sometimes led to increases in “fear, tension,
and stress” among family members.
Foreclosure has been found to be closely associated with poor health among
all family members. Because foreclosure can be both the result of poor health (and
its associated expenses and loss of employment) and a potential cause, it is often
difficult to determine the causal role it might play. A study in Philadelphia found
that clients of a mortgage counseling agency who were undergoing foreclosure
had high rates of depression, hypertension, and heart disease (Pollack and Lynch
2009). Overall, almost 37 percent of these clients suffered from major depression. In a study of hospital visits and foreclosures in four states, Currie and Tekin
(2011) found that a spike in neighborhood foreclosures was associated with significant increases in unscheduled hospital visits, even after controlling for changes
in unemployment, housing prices, migration, and other factors.
Longitudinal data allow for more precise measurement of the causal effects
of foreclosure on physical and mental health. Alley et al. (2011) examined the results of a national longitudinal survey of adults over age 50 during the 2006–2008
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period. Even after controlling for a wide variety of demographic, financial, and
health variables, they found that mortgage delinquency was a strong predictor
of negative changes in physical and mental health. Delinquent borrowers were
almost eight times as likely to develop elevated depression compared with nondelinquent borrowers. They were also almost eight times as likely to develop
food insecurity and almost nine times as likely to develop cost-related medication
nonadherence.
Foreclosure and residential instability may be particularly hard on the elderly
or near-elderly. The elderly can be especially adversely affected by forced relocations (Danermark and Ekstrom 1990; Smith and Ferryman 2006). Seniors may
be particularly dependent on social networks and relationships for their day-today living circumstances and may be emotionally and psychologically less resilient to involuntary stressors and changes.
Costs to Neighborhoods and Communities

Foreclosures can impose economic and social costs on surrounding neighborhoods and larger communities. Because housing is such a large part of the economy, home values have a direct effect on household wealth and expenditures,
and mortgage market problems can—especially in less regulated environments—
spread rapidly to broader credit and capital markets. High levels of foreclosures
across the country can also trigger major problems in national and international
financial and employment markets (Levitin and Wachter 2013). The focus here,
however, is on neighborhood and local effects.
Foreclosure might lower not only the value of the foreclosed home but also
the value of nearby homes, which in turn can result in lower property tax collections and attendant fiscal stress. The mechanisms through which this can happen
have generally been disaggregated into three types. First, foreclosures represent
an increase in housing supply, and especially if they increase quickly, they can effectively create a “supply shock” in a neighborhood housing submarket, putting
downward pressure on prices.
Second, the discounted prices at which foreclosed homes tend to sell may
change the nature of comparable sales used by home buyers and appraisers to
determine the value of available homes. If foreclosures become a sizable share of
home sales, as they often did in hard-hit neighborhoods during the foreclosure
crisis, and there are few traditional “arms-length” sales in an area not involving
banks or servicers, appraisers may be effectively forced to consider real estate
owned (REO) sales in the appraisal process (especially if the most comparable
sales available over the past few months were those of foreclosed properties).
In many distressed neighborhoods during the peak of the crisis, there were few
comparable sales that did not involve at least one foreclosed property.
Finally, foreclosed homes are often vacant and may be dilapidated. Both vacancy and dilapidation can act as disamenities that deter buyers (Hartley 2011).
Especially during times when home buyer demand is already weak, having one
or two (or more) vacant, and sometimes boarded-up, properties on a block may
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discourage the scarce buyers active in a market from purchasing in that neighborhood. Research has shown that foreclosed homes tend to be in worse condition
than owner-occupied properties. In a study of property complaints in the city
of Boston from 2008 to 2012, Lambie-Hanson (2013) found that the typical
single-family property was more than nine times as likely to receive a complaint
from the public while in bank ownership (after foreclosure) as when the previous owner was current on his or her mortgage. Moreover, merely the presence of
a vacant home nearby can increase owners’ (and potential buyers’) uncertainty
about the trajectory of home values on the block.
In comments on an earlier version of this chapter, Jim Follain (2014) wisely
pointed out a fourth mechanism for the effect on nearby homes that has received
less attention in the literature. If higher foreclosure rates in a neighborhood trigger
high-risk premiums among mortgage lenders, these higher premiums might lower
the price buyers are willing or able to pay for homes in the area. Of course, this
mechanism depends on the extent of pricing differentials triggered by perceived risks
due to foreclosures. In lending environments in which risk-based pricing is more
common, more severe, and more geographically specific, the proximate impacts of
foreclosures on nondistressed home values would be expected to be greater.
The disamenity mechanism has been the most widely suggested of the mechanisms outlined here. Foreclosures that lead to vacant properties may become
havens for criminal activity, which in turn can depress property values even more.
As values decline in a neighborhood, more and more homeowners become underwater, making it difficult or impossible to sell their properties and forcing
more homeowners into foreclosure, thus creating a vicious cycle of foreclosures
and declines in value. Foreclosures can also spur rapid neighborhood change by
forcing out longtime residents and in some cases allowing irresponsible investors
or speculators to move in.
Immergluck and Smith (2006a) were the first to measure the impact of foreclosures on nearby property values. Using hedonic regression and data from Chicago in the late 1990s, they found that foreclosures were associated with lower
property values of nearby homes, even after controlling for a wide variety of other
demographic and property characteristics, including home values in the larger
surrounding neighborhood. Each additional foreclosure within an eighth of a
mile of a property was associated with a decline in value of 1–1.5 percent. This
study was widely cited in efforts to develop policies to respond to the foreclosure
crisis and demonstrates the spillover effects of foreclosures on neighbors.
In the wake of the crisis, many researchers expanded on the methods and
data of this study to examine foreclosure’s effects on nearby property values, espe
cially beginning in the mid-2000s. For example, Hartley (2011) examined foreclosures in Chicago over a longer period, from 1999 to 2008, and found that in
high-vacancy census tracts, the effect of a foreclosure on property values within
250 feet was approximately −2 percent, while the effect in low-vacancy tracts was
smaller. These findings were roughly consistent with those of Immergluck and
Smith (2006a).
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In another study, based on data from 1987 to 2008 in the state of Massachusetts, Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (2011) found that a foreclosure within
0.05 mile lowered the price of a house by approximately 1 percent. Mikelbank
(2008) found negative effects of foreclosures on housing values in his analysis of
2006 sales in Columbus, Ohio, but he also found that vacant homes had an even
stronger negative effect on prices than nonvacant foreclosures. Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2009) analyzed foreclosures and property sales in seven metropolitan areas from 1989 to 2007 using a repeat sales analysis, which controls
for neighborhood conditions. They found that each foreclosure within 300 feet
of a property had a −1 percent effect on the property’s value and that the effect
reached its peak at the time of the foreclosure sale.
In New York City, using data from 2000 to 2005, Schuetz, Been, and Ellen
(2008) found that the effect of foreclosures on home prices was nonlinear, meaning that there was little or no effect until a certain threshold number of foreclosures was reached, after which the effect became more sizable. This finding
suggests a sort of quadratic relationship between foreclosures and values, where
additional foreclosures result in increasingly large (in magnitude) negative spill
overs. (It should be noted that there was not really a foreclosure crisis in New
York City during this period.)
Some studies, including Daneshvary, Clauretie, and Kader (2011), have
found nonlinearities in the other direction, meaning that saturation is reached at
some point, after which additional foreclosures appear to have little impact on
the magnitude of the (negative) spillover. More particularly, in that study, which
looked at data from 2008 and 2009 in Las Vegas, the authors found that the first
couple of foreclosures within one-half mile of a property had no impact on its
value. After that, the effect increased, up to about 20 foreclosures, after which
it stayed relatively flat or even declined slightly. The authors identified a linear
rate of increase up to a cumulative effect of about an 8 percent negative spillover
(within three months of the foreclosure). After 20 foreclosures, a saturation point
was reached.
Other researchers also have identified saturation points. For example, in a
study of home sales in the Nashville area from 2001 to 2012, Huang et al. (2014)
found steep reductions in values as neighborhood foreclosure rates increased.
Such increases reached an inflection point as the foreclosure rate reached 1 percent, at which the cumulative negative spillover effect reached a maximum magnitude of approximately $12,000. It may be that the study by Schuetz, Been, and
Ellen (2008) did not detect a saturation point because foreclosures did not reach
high levels in the city during the study period, which predated the peak of the
foreclosure problem there.
An exhaustive catalog of the dozens of studies measuring the effects of foreclosures on home values is beyond the scope of this chapter. Moreover, any effort
to definitively summarize the magnitude of these effects would be extremely difficult because the studies varied widely across a number of parameters, such as
those outlined in the following list.
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1. The locations and conditions of the housing markets varied greatly. Variations in housing markets would be expected to affect the severity of foreclosure
effects on values. Most of the studies, due largely to data availability, focused on
just one city or metropolitan area. Some studies attempted to analyze data in several metropolitan areas, but this was further complicated by varying legal definitions of foreclosure from state to state and even sometimes across county or local
boundaries.
2. The morphology and density of the cities studied varied greatly. For example, Chicago is four times as dense as Atlanta (with density defined as hous
ing units per acre). A buffer of a half mile around a house in Chicago, therefore,
would be likely to capture many more adjacent homes, and potential foreclo
sures, as the same buffer would in Atlanta.
3. Foreclosure can mean many things, and the detectable events involved in
the default and foreclosure process depend on state legal prescriptions and how
data are reported or collected. In some states, formal foreclosure filings are required at the beginning of the process, while in other states a simple newspaper
notice suffices. Some of the studies focused on foreclosure notices or filings, while
others examined properties sold at foreclosure auctions or those either entering
or already in REO status. Some studies attempted to disentangle the effects of different stages of the foreclosure process, and some even attempted to measure the
effects of foreclosure alternatives, especially short sales.
4. The studies used different geographic buffers in calculating the incidence
of nearby foreclosure activity. Most of them employed simple circular radial buffers, but some used other techniques, including the face-block concept, which essentially means examining the effects of foreclosures on the same street or across
the street, but not on nearby streets.
5. Some studies measured both distance- and time-based decays in effects,
and the trigger points for measuring time decays varied.
6. Some studies measured nonlinearities in the cumulative effects of multiple
foreclosures, while others did not.
7. The studies used different models, econometric techniques, and sources of
data. Among the models used were standard hedonic ordinary least squares, repeatsales, and panel models. Some of the studies controlled for spatial autocorrelation,
and others did not. Data sources varied, including local public records, Multiple
Listing Service (MLS) data, and vendor-provided data, which might in turn be
based on public records, loan servicing data, or other sources. Although research
in mortgage and housing markets increasingly has relied on vendor-provided
data, the quality of such data is largely unexplored.
Despite the heterogeneity of the data and methods, the literature as a whole is
remarkably consistent in one finding: foreclosures have a statistically significant
and economically meaningful negative effect on nearby property values. In his
review of an early subset of the literature, Frame (2010) concluded that foreclo
sures do indeed have a negative impact on nearby property values, with the effect
declining over time and space.
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The magnitude of all these effects varies widely, as do the metrics used in
the studies. Moreover, it is very difficult to tell whether this variation is due to
measuring effects—in different cities, at different points in time (e.g., before or
after 2007–2008), at different points in the foreclosure process, or using fundamentally different econometric specifications or techniques—or to some other
difference among the studies.
A closely related set of studies have focused on the issue of foreclosure contagion—that is, do more foreclosures in an area, independent of other housing
market forces, lead homeowners in that area or in nearby areas to default and/or
enter foreclosure? If foreclosures lead to lower nearby home values, one might
expect the answer to be yes, especially since declining home values can make
households more vulnerable to foreclosure (if they encounter financial hardships,
they will find it more difficult to sell or refinance their homes). While fewer studies have addressed this issue than the price impact issue, those that have done so
have generally found evidence of foreclosure contagion.
Munroe and Wilse-Samson (2013) examined Chicago real estate records for
2002–2011 and found that a completed foreclosure, compared with the dismissal
of a foreclosure case, raised the probability of a new foreclosure filing within
0.1 mile by 10 percent per year. This amounted to about 0.5 new filings per year.
Moreover, they found that this effect lasted three to four years. They also found
that contagion led to more completed foreclosures in nearby areas. Li (2013)
used MLS data from 2005–2009 for the city of Milwaukee and found that, other
things being equal, nearby foreclosure activity positively affected the probability
that a homeowner would enter foreclosure. Moreover, Li showed that the magni
tude of this contagion declined over time and distance. For example, a foreclo
sure occurring within the previous three to six months and within 200 meters of
a house increased the probability of foreclosure on that house by just over 3 percent. However, a foreclosure farther away—between 500 and 1,000 meters—increased this probability by only 1 percent. If the foreclosure had occurred a year
or two before, the effect on the probability of foreclosure was even smaller. Thus,
a declining effect over time and space was detected.
Goodstein et al. (2011) analyzed nationwide data from the mortgage data
provider Lender Processing Services and found that the likelihood of a mortgage default increased by 0.03 percent in response to a 1 percent increase in the
foreclosure rate in zip codes within five miles. This result is not trivial. A one stan
dard deviation increase in the foreclosure rate of the surrounding area would increase the likelihood of mortgage default by as much as 24 percent. The authors
controlled for county-level demographic changes and zip-code-level changes in
home prices.
Foreclosure and Crime

Research has found a connection between foreclosure and crime. Homes left vacant for protracted periods can become sites of criminal activity. The earliest study
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on the link between foreclosure and crime was done in Chicago in 1999–2001.
The study found that higher foreclosure levels in Chicago neighborhoods were
associated with higher levels of violent crime, even after controlling for a large
number of other neighborhood characteristics (Immergluck and Smith 2006b).
A number of other studies have reported consistent results. Stucky, Ottensmann,
and Payton (2012) observed that foreclosures in Indianapolis during the middleto-late 2000s were associated with an increase in neighborhood crime rates (both
property crimes and violent crimes). Teasdale, Clark, and Hinkle (2012) found
similar results in Akron.
In general, studies using fine-grained data at the neighborhood scale—many
with better data sets and more sophisticated methods than the earliest studies—
have found that foreclosure leads to increased crime, although some of these findings vary in their details. In a study of New York City between 2004 and 2008,
Ellen, Lacoe, and Sharygin (2013) concluded that foreclosures on a particular
block led to more total crimes on that block, with the largest increase being in
violent crimes. Cui (2010) analyzed crime and foreclosure data in Pittsburgh
and found that violent crimes within 250 feet of a foreclosed home increased by
more than 15 percent once the home became vacant; similar increases in property crimes occurred. Cui also found that longer versus shorter vacancy periods
had larger effects on crime. Williams, Galster, and Verma (2014) used data from
Chicago for the years 1998–2009 to disentangle the potential reverse causality
between foreclosure and crime. They found that property crime chronologically
lags completed foreclosures and not vice versa, adding support to the notion that
foreclosure causes crime and is not simply correlated with it for other reasons.
Some studies have not attempted to estimate the specific effect of foreclosure on
crime but have found an effect of vacancy on crime, and some vacancies are likely
associated with foreclosures. Branas, Rubin, and Guo (2012), for example, found
that vacant property was among the strongest predictors of assault when tested
along with a dozen demographic and socioeconomic variables.
Other studies have attempted to measure the effect of foreclosure on crime at
somewhat larger geographic levels, such as counties. However, these studies have
often suffered from the fact that crime varies tremendously at very small geographic levels, much of which will not be picked up at the larger geographic scale.
Some of them have also faced challenges in developing accurate and unbiased
measures of foreclosure rates across different geographies and jurisdictions.

. An example is Arnio, Baumer, and Wolff (2012), who used counties as the geographic unit of
analysis and employed a foreclosure rate in which the denominator was the number of housing
units in the county. The denominator is problematic because it can severely overestimate the
number of one- to four-unit properties on which there could be a mortgage in counties where
there are many multifamily rental housing units. This problem creates a systematic bias in the
measure of foreclosure rates across and within different metropolitan areas.
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Foreclosure and Fiscal Stress

Foreclosures and associated vacancies may entail a variety of fiscal costs to local
governments. These include the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Increased policing due to vandalism and other crimes.
An increased burden on the fire department due to arson.
Costs of boarding up and demolishing buildings.
Costs of removing trash and mowing lawns.
Costs of managing the foreclosure process, including record keeping and
legal expenses.
Lost property tax revenue if the building owner stops paying taxes.
Lost property tax revenue due to declining values of nearby properties.
Lost economic development benefits due to decreased desirability of the
community for commercial/industrial development.

In a study of Chicago before the mortgage crisis of the early 2000s, Apgar
and Duda (2005) found that direct costs to city government sometimes exceeded
$30,000 per foreclosure. More recent anecdotal evidence supports the high costs
of foreclosure and related vacancy. Chicago officials estimated that it cost almost
$900,000 to board up and secure just over 600 properties (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2011). Meanwhile, a study of Baltimore estimated that each
vacant property increased annual police and fire expenditures by almost $1,500
(Winthrop and Herr 2009).
On the revenue side, the fall in housing prices, often spurred or accelerated
by foreclosures, led to a decline in property tax revenues in many cities during the
late 2000s. Chernick, Langley, and Reschovsky (2011) concluded that in cities hit
hard by the foreclosure crisis, lower property values would lead to major declines
in property tax revenues. In Las Vegas, for example, they estimated a 22 percent
drop in revenues, while in Modesto and Stockton, California, their estimates
were in the range of 24–25 percent.

Conclusions  
The research detailed in this chapter focused on the relatively near-term impacts
of foreclosure on households and neighborhoods. The literature generally shows
that foreclosure resulted in negative, nontrivial effects on household financial
conditions, health, and schooling, among other important variables. The research
on foreclosure contagion and the effects of foreclosure on nearby property values
was unequivocal in that almost all the studies found nontrivial negative impacts
resulting from foreclosure. The robustness of the methods and the geographic diversity of the studies suggest that these effects were usually economically substantial. However, the heterogeneity in the data, methods, and geographic locations
employed makes it very difficult to develop any sort of statistics that would accurately capture any central tendency of the magnitude of these effects. In terms
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of the effects of foreclosure on crime, the stronger studies that used sound mea
sures of foreclosure activity at small geographic levels tended to find material im
pacts of foreclosure on crime, or in some cases regression-adjusted associations.
However, this research was not quite as large or robust as the property value
literature.
This chapter did not explore research that has examined the longer-term
effects or trajectories of foreclosure, including the purchase of properties by investors, the conversion of properties from owner-occupied to rental uses, or the
redevelopment of properties using subsidies such as the federal Neighborhood
Stabilization Program. Examples of this research include Immergluck and Law
(2013) and Pfeiffer and Molina (2013). Another related area of inquiry that has
received little attention is the longer-term impacts of the foreclosure crisis on housing tenure in areas where investors may have converted many owner-occupied
homes to rental properties. To the extent that some neighborhoods may have
seen rapid declines in owner occupancy rates, especially in areas that had relatively high home ownership rates before the crisis, the effects of the crisis could
be significant. Moreover, the receptiveness of such neighborhoods to the conversion of owner-occupied single-family homes to rental properties—including the
potential fair housing implications—deserves more scrutiny.
In terms of policy implications, some lessons are generally clear. Foreclo
sure imposes sizable negative costs on individuals, families, and neighborhoods.
Many of these costs affect those not involved in the mortgage transaction. When
attempting to reform mortgage markets and adopt new regulations, policy makers must consider the damage done by reckless or overly aggressive mortgage
lending practices. Many of the policy initiatives thus far have been federally regulated and focused on protecting consumers. These are worthy efforts, but the
spatial implications of concentrated risky lending and the associated foreclosures
suggest that local and state governments have a stake in this reform effort, too.
Fortunately, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, by limiting the preemption of state
mortgage regulations, allows states to retain the ability to regulate markets if
they view federal efforts as insufficient. Given the costs to localities and neighborhoods reported here, this is appropriate.
In addition, federal efforts to reform mortgage markets that relied too heavily
on privatization may result in new boom-bust markets and more risk-based pricing—possibly at the neighborhood level. Replacing the cross-subsidization that
occurred in the traditional government-sponsored secondary markets with much
higher levels of risk-based pricing and a resurgence of high-risk lenders may amplify the tendency toward neighborhood-level housing market volatility and exacerbate the spillover effects of default and foreclosure. Under such a system, as
foreclosures increased and values fell, lenders would be likely to charge substantially higher rates in the most heavily impacted neighborhoods, fostering another
downward spiral. A more uniform and less segmented mortgage market, with
less severe risk-based pricing, should dampen the effects of mortgage distress
in neighborhoods experiencing foreclosures, mitigating against vicious cycles. In
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addition to encouraging cross-subsidization and broader, less specialized second
ary markets, federal (and state) agencies should aggressively enforce the Fair
Housing Act to minimize excessive mortgage pricing disparities, which could
exacerbate spatial contagion of housing market problems and negative spillovers
into the mortgage and housing markets.
State and local governments also have a role to play. They need the tools to
intervene in property markets at the earliest signs of mortgage and housing distress, both to stem the tide of foreclosures and to mitigate against the blight and
vacancy that can accompany them. These tools might include the ability to assemble and redevelop or demolish distressed properties that harm nearby homes and
entire neighborhoods. It is much more difficult to address these sorts of problems
after they have reached crisis proportions, as they did in many neighborhoods
in 2008 and 2009.
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